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ABSTRACT

In 2018, a Chinese scientist, Jiankun He, announced the birth of two HIV-resistant babies
through his experiment of human genetic engineering. This incidence has soon shocked the entire
scientific community and invoked public outrage towards He’s corrupt moral integrity.
However, this event should also act as a harbinger to the human society that the technique
of human genetic engineering is rapidly approaching maturity. In that case, how should we respond?
This thesis focuses on the moral issues surrounding human genetic engineering and
advertises an accepting moral attitude to this booming technology. This thesis will first discuss the
types of human genetic engineering that bioethicists usually make and reject their moral
significance. This thesis will then proceed to defend human genetic engineering against seven
types of moral objections and establish the moral permissibility of human genetic engineering.
Finally, this thesis contends that in the future society which guarantees the safety and accessibility
of human genetic engineering, parents have the moral obligation to use human genetic engineering
for the betterment of their children.
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1. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MORAL DEBATE OF HUMAN

GENETIC ENGINEERING

1.1.

INTRODUCTION TO HUMAN GENETIC ENGINEERING
The scientific enthusiasm of genetic study began with the rediscovery of Gregor Mendel’s

theory of genetic inheritance in the early 20th century. With the DNA structure clarified by
James Watson and Francis Crick, geneticists took full advantage of the structural knowledge
of DNA and started to pioneer DNA cloning that signaled the start of genetic engineering.
Genetic engineering, also known as recombinant DNA technology, refers to intentional
manipulations of genetic information through chemical splicing of selected DNA fragments
from different species and introducing the resulting DNA into the target organism. In 1972,
Stanford University succeeded in creating the first recombinant DNA and, in the subsequent
year, inserted the DNA into the plasmid of Escherichia coli bacterium (Nicholl, 2002). Since
then, the development of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) has been unstoppable and
spreads its products to every aspect of our life. For example, genetically engineered food is
prevalent in today’s supermarkets, as altered genes help the crops and livestock resist diseases
and give the food a better taste and more nutritional content (U.S. National Library of
Medicines, 2021). Modern medicines like antibiotics and insulin also find their sources in
genetically engineered E. coli and yeast that produce high-quality yield with minimal cost
(Baeshen et al., 2014). With the completion of Human Genome Project that reveals the full
sequence of human genomes and the invention of the CRISPR-Cas 9 technique that allows
scientists to manipulate genetic materials with unprecedentedly high precision, efficiency, and
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flexibility, genetic technology has advanced to the step where scientists can readily edit human
genes and make improvements to the human race. This artificial manipulation of human DNA
has been known as Human Genetic Engineering (HGE).

1.2.

INTRODUCTION TO THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE OF HUMAN
GENETIC ENGINEERING
In 2018, Chinese biophysicists, Jiankun He, announced the birth of two genetically

engineered babies, Lulu and Nana, with genes naturally resistant to HIV disease. He used the
CRISPR-Cas 9 to modify the CCR5 gene of the two babies at their embryonic stage and
implanted them for pregnancy. This news of genetically engineered babies shocked the global
scientific community and incited overwhelming criticism, as He has “defied scientific
conventions, ignored basic rules for research on human subjects, and violated multiple norms
of medical practice” (van Beers, 2020). The HGE technique employed in He’s research was
still at the very experimental stage and guarantees no safety for the two babies. Besides, there
is no sure proof that the mutated CCR gene would effectively induce HIV resistance without
causing any harm. Even his own research data suggests that his effort to modify the CCR gene
is only partially successful as his experiment did not entirely alter all CCR genes in the embryos
and resulted in off-target altered genes (Kolata & Belluck, 2018). Overall, given He’s
immature experimentation, his HGE attempt on two babies is certainly an irresponsible and
morally reprehensible act.
Nevertheless, this incident of genetically engineered babies invokes reflection among the
entire society on future HGE. Suppose He had progressed his research in a more responsible
manner and achieved complication-free HIV resistance as he promised. In that case, he might
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have “single-handedly brought humankind a significant step closer to taking genetic fate into
its own hands” (van Beers, 2020). When HGE technology finally comes to maturity and wide
application, how should we morally respond to the changes in the human race and our society?
How should we organize and distribute this technology? Can we practically handle the
consequences of HGE?
Indeed, in the face of this alien yet rapidly advancing technology, we often find ourselves
in a myriad of worries and doubts. This thesis first attempts to dismiss common ethical
distinctions that separate HGE into morally different categories in section 2. The thesis then
categorizes objections towards HGE into three types—deontic, consequentialist, and
miscellaneous—to establish the moral permissibility of HGE in section 3. Although some
objections may not be as clear cut as to one category or the other, roughly speaking, deontic
objections discuss whether HGE is inherently good as an enhancement practice, while
consequentialist objections question whether the results brought by HGE are beneficial. After
establishing the moral permissibility of HGE from both deontological and consequentialist
positions, in section 4, this thesis will elevate the moral status of HGE and argue that HGE is
not only morally permissible but morally obligated given parental obligations to better their
children’s life. Finally, the thesis will conclude with support towards HGE and discuss
potential future works in this area.
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2. TYPES OF HUMAN GENETIC ENGINEERING

2.1.

INTRODUCTION TO TYPES OF HUMAN GENETIC ENGINEERING
Before discussing the objections towards HGE, it is worthwhile to discuss some

distinctions of HGE recognized by some bioethicists, as they believe different types of HGE
requires separate deontic and consequentialist evaluations. The main two distinctions
commonly discussed are between negative and positive enhancements and between regular
and radical enhancements. This thesis will argue that despite attempts to separate HGE into
morally and practically different types, these distinctions are unnecessary, and there is no
rational foundation to treat some types of HGE differently than others.

2.2.

NEGATIVE VERSUS POSITIVE ENHANCEMENT

2.2.1. Introduction to Negative and Positive Enhancement
Negative enhancement, also known as gene therapy or cures, aims to correct genetic defects,
while positive enhancement intends to make improvements to normal humans (Glover, 1984).
In other words, negative enhancement is to raise individuals to the norm, while positive
enhancement is to raise them above the norm (Freiman, 2018). According to this distinction,
HGE therapy that eliminates the extra 21st chromosome of children inflicted with Down’s
syndrome and brings their mental and physical abilities to the level of normal individuals is a
negative enhancement. On the other hand, HGE practice that raises the intelligence of a normal
child by 40 will be categorized as a positive enhancement.
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People can usually well accept the practices of negative enhancement, as allowing normal
life to individuals who would otherwise have a genetically damaged life seems hardly morally
objectionable. Suppose it is possible to salvage a baby from mentally decapacitating Down’s
syndrome through HGE. In that case, it is unlikely to see anyone sympathetic to the baby’s
condition would object, if the parents hope to adopt the HGE treatment.
On the other hand, philosophers show various concerns about the positive enhancement
that endows individuals with abilities surpassing the norm. They worry that children surpassing
the human norm would infringe the divinity of God, denigrate humanity to something artificial
and manipulatable, interfere with the regular human evolution, fundamentally change the
social and family structure, and even result in an apocalypse of the human race (these
objections and more will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3 and 4). Ultimately, separating
HGE into negative and positive enhancements pushes positive enhancement into the spotlight
of criticism and permits the negative enhancement to fade out of the discussion.

2.2.2. Response to Positive and Negative Distinction: The Blurry Norms
As the philosophers attempt to demarcate positive enhancement from the negative
enhancement, one standard is always mentioned: the normal individual. Yet it does not seem
obvious how to consistently define the norm in many cases.

2.2.2.1.

Statistical Norm

Let’s first consider the norm to be the statistical average. Francis Fukuyama has extensively
discussed that many traits of one population will present itself as a normal distribution
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(Fukuyama, 2002). Fukuyama uses heights of male and female in the United States in 2000 as
an example in the following figure (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Heights Distribution of Males and Females in the United States of America in
2000 (Fukuyama, 2002)

He argues that the "normal" heights present themselves as statistical features in a bell-curve
distribution, such as means, median, and variances. While a population means or median may
be considered "normal" in some stringent definitions, a "normal" height is generally within
two standard deviations of the population. Besides general features like heights and weights,
the statistical normal is especially useful in the medical field (Fukuyama, 2002). Consider a
report card from a medical examination. The card will usually tell one whether one’s blood
pressure, blood sugar, and cholesterol level fall into the normal level. If any of these indicators
on one’s report card goes below or above the normal range, it may be necessary for some
medical intervention for the benefits of one’s health.
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However, there are several problems with this statistical definition of norm. Firstly, many
features of a human population are impossible to be quantified. For example, some people have
a better sense of music that allows them to understand and play music better than others.
However, it would be an impossible task to measure one’s musical sensibility, as these features
are essentially abstract. Another example would be personality traits. Although there are many
available personalities tests, such as the famous Myers & Briggs 16 personality test, these tests
do not generate quantitative results (although there are numbers used for calculations purpose,
test takers are suggested to take these numerical results as a grain of salt) (The Myers & Briggs
Foundation, 2021). Therefore, it would be difficult to find a norm for these unquantifiable traits
since they are inherently subjective and abstract,
Furthermore, these unquantifiable features do not restrict themselves to aesthetic abilities
or abstract constitutions since the measuring methods of some seemingly quantifiable traits are
controversial. A good example would be intelligence. The most standardized method to
measure individual intelligence is through an IQ test. Nevertheless, since the invention of the
IQ test by Alfred Binet in 1905, the testing methodology has always been in the center of
psychologists’ frictions and was once notoriously applied in the eugenic programs to determine
whether some individuals were “feebly minded” (Beit-Hallahmi, 1994). One major problem
of IQ testing is that individuals’ intelligence manifests in various forms that are difficult to
compare through numerical measurements. For instance, Matthew is very good at
understanding mathematical concepts and solving geometrical problems. On the other hand,
Philip can learn a series of gymnastic moves with a quick glance. Say if Philip has trouble in
his math classes, it would be unfair to test IQ purely through math and doubt Philip’s mental
capability. Similarly, if it takes months for Matthew to learn a gymnastic trick, it does not mean
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Matthew is less intelligent than Philip. Overall, Matthew and Philip are both undeniably
intelligent, but their intelligence manifests in different aspects. Therefore, it would be prudent
to think twice before announcing norms for these seemingly quantifiable population features,
as quantification of some inherently unquantifiable traits would lead to misrepresentation and
sometimes dire consequences.
Moreover, a statistical model of “normal” is contingent on the selection of the population,
which only complicates the matter rather than delivering an accurate, consistent “norm.”
Because an infinite population would be impossible to measure, and the measurement will
yield less relevant results, statisticans always confine their data to a particular population at a
given time. Take the following analogy: Randy is considering renting an apartment in New
York City and hopes to get the best deal by comparing the listings. It would certainly be
imprudent if Randy were to check all rental listings worldwide, as the task is quite impossible
to perform and does not give Randy useful results. Therefore, Randy should constrain his
search to New York City (and probably to a specific borough of New York City) so that it
becomes probable for him to perform the task and obtain helpful results in the end.
Nevertheless, population selection would become a problem to define the “normal,” since
what is “normal” is always relative to the population that one selects. For example, Ibrahim
has a perfectly normal height of an Indonesian male. Yet when he travels to the Netherlands,
he suddenly finds his height way below the statistical normal range in the world’s tallest
country. Does Ibrahim become not normal during his trip to the Netherlands? It certainly is
unreasonable to determine whether one is normal merely based on the definition of “normal”
at his surrounding environment. How about using racial or ethnic groups as statistically
meaningful units? In this case, Ibrahim should use the Indonesian standard as he is an
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Indonesian and identifies himself as Indonesian. But this criteria for population selection
complicates the matter even more, as it involves too much subjectivity. The racial distinction
is considered merely subjective (and often discriminative) separation as there is no scientific
support for any biological racial difference. Ethnical categorization gives an even more blurred
distinction as it usually involves subjective self-identification (Rattansi, 2007). After all, a
population selection by racial and ethnic groups defeats the purpose of statistical normality, as
this supposedly objective normality becomes a subjective, personal standard. Overall, because
the generation of statistical normality necessarily relies on population selection, the statistical
normal becomes quite undependable as it cannot yield relevant results without introducing
obscuring subjectivity.
Finally, statistical norms always suffer the Sorties Paradox. A Sorties Paradox is an ancient
paradox that questions the transition from quantitative changes to qualitative change due to
linguistic vagueness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2018). Suppose Harry plucks out
one single strand of hair from his lushly hairy head. Harry is certainly not bald. Harry then
plucks out the second strand of hair. He is still not bald. Harry keeps plucking out his hair.
Every time he plucks out a single strand of hair, he looks at his head and confirms that he is
not bald. Nonetheless, Harry eventually becomes bald despite that he is not bald every time he
plucks out a hair. Philosophers consider the absurdity arises because of the vagueness in the
definition of “bald.” Baldness is not something that we can assign a numerical value to hair
number; thus, it is tough to pinpoint a specific number of hair when Harry transitions from
“hairy” to “bald.”
Jonathan Glover uses the Sorties Paradox to respond to the statistical normal of emotional
status (Glover, 1984). Glover presents the example that emotional state is often associated with
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the enzyme level in one’s body. When one’s enzyme level gets below a certain level, one
becomes depressed, a sub-normal or abnormal state. But there does not seem to be a definite
enzyme level threshold when one can sharply feel that one’s emotion drops from normal to
depressed (Glover, 1984). Even though Fukuyama gives us a strict statistical standard of
normal (i.e., the median or means plus or minus two standard variations), this standard is still
susceptible to the Sorites Paradox. Say, in today’s America, the male height that is two standard
deviations below the means is 5.3 feet. Therefore, by Fukuyama’s definition, 5.3 feet would
be right on the edge of normality. Then what about 5.299 feet? Fukuyama may say that is
abnormal. Yet it is only 0.001 feet, or 0.012 inches, below 5.3 feet. The difference is not even
discernible by naked eyes! It would certainly be absurd to call one person normal and the other
not normal based on some imperceptible differences. Then what about 5.298 feet… There goes
the Sorites Paradox again.
Why does the statistical standard of the norm fail in the face of Sorites Paradox? The
answer is something familiar: “normal” is not a quantifiable concept. Quantifying normality is
like quantifying one’s musical sense or personality, as the sense of “normal” used in our daily
language is inherently abstract and vague.
Ultimately, it is futile to implement statistical models to justify what is normal because of
the prevalence of inherently unquantifiable human traits, subjectivity in statistical population
selection, and the abstract, unquantifiable nature of our sense of normality.

2.2.2.2.

Intuitional Norms

Aside from the statistical norm, one other norm that people usually apply in judgment is
the intuitional norm. Intuitional norm describes what is self-evidently “normal” judged by
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one’s “spontaneous unreflected judgment” (Huemer, 2005). If one’s intuition says something
is normal, it is then normal; if one’s intuition kicks in and shouts not normal, by the standard
of the intuitional norm, that thing is not normal. For example, when Sally sees a man with three
eyes, she immediately knows that this man is not normal since her instinct unwaveringly tells
her so. (This intuitional standard of normality also reminds me of a warning that my study
abroad consultant often tells me: “if something does not feel right, it is likely not right.”)
The theoretical support for intuitional norm roots in the Principle of Conservatism. The
Principle of Conservatism states that “without further objections, other things being equal, it
is reasonable to assume that things are the way they appear” (Huemer, 2005). For example,
since the sky appears to be blue to my eyes, without further evidence denying the blueness of
the sky, it is reasonable for me to assume that the sky is blue. Likewise, the Principle of
Conservatism justifies the institutional norm since, without further objections, it is reasonable
to judge whether something is normal by the way it presents itself to the judging subject. Back
to the previous example, according to the Principle of Conservatism, since the three-eyed man
seems abnormal to Sally, without further objection, it is reasonable for Sally to assume that the
three-eyed man is abnormal.
One prominent advantage of the intuitional norm is that it can eschew the problem of
Sorites Paradox. How can we tell when the hair-plucking Harry is going bald? By intuition.
Even though we cannot identify a specific point where Harry goes from hairy to bald, at each
stage, we can intuitively know whether Harry is hairy or bald. Similarly, in Glover’s example,
individuals can tell whether they are happy or depressed by intuitively interacting with their
own feelings. Sir William D. Ross compares intuitional norms to the apprehension of beauty,
where he writes that “the judgment as to the rightness of a particular act is just like the judgment
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as to the beauty of a particular natural object or work of art” (Ross, 1930). In other words, Ross
suggests individuals’ intuitions, analogous to their beauty apprehension, provides a ballpark
estimation for what is normal and is perfectly sufficient for daily-life judgments.
In the context of genetic enhancement, Steven Rose uses “a considerable unease reflected
in custom and law” to justify his objection towards biochemical enhancements that are beyond
the ordinary comprehension of normality (Rose, 2002). Leon Kass extensively discusses the
“wisdom of repugnance”:

In crucial cases, however, repugnance is the emotional expression of deep wisdom, beyond reason’s power
fully to articulate it. Can anyone really give an argument fully adequate to the horror which is father-daughter
incest (even with consent), or having sex with animals, or mutilating a corpse, or eating human flesh, or even just
(just!) raping or murdering another human being? Would anybody’s failure to give full rational justification for
his or her revulsion at these practices make that revulsion ethically suspect? Not at all. […] Repugnance, here as
elsewhere, revolts against the excesses of human willfulness, warning us not to transgress what is unspeakably
profound. Indeed, in this age in which everything is held to be permissible so long as it is freely done, in which
our given human nature no longer commands respect, in which our bodies are regarded as mere instruments of
our autonomous rational wills, repugnance may be the only voice left that speaks up to defend the central core of
our humanity. Shallow are the souls that have forgotten how to shudder (Kass, 1998).

Nonetheless, there is a fundamental problem with the intuitional norm. Even though
philosophers argue that intuitions are inherent and have the status as “the emotional expression
of deep wisdom,” they are, in fact, quite malleable through environmental conditioning. To
show how easily individuals’ instincts can be swayed, moral philosopher, Kwame Appiah,
presents a psychology experiment where a little hypnotic priming significantly shapes
participants’ moral intuitions. In this experiment, psychologists firstly prime participants to
feel disgusted whenever encountering an emotionally neutral word, such as “take” or “often.”
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Then, psychologists present participants with morally neutral scenarios containing the word
“take” and “often” and ask participants to judge these scenarios based on their moral intuitions.
For example, they present participants with a scenario where a student-council representative
“often” attempts to choose topics that would appeal to both professors and students for
academic discussions. Although this student-council representative conducts no morally
troubling actions, participants harshly judge this representative, giving moral condemnation
like “it just seems like he’s up to something” (Appiah, 2008). Through this psychological
experiment, it is evident that individual intuitions are pliable under conditioning. Therefore,
the intuitional norm is an unreliable and inconsistent measure of normality rather than, as Kass
promotes, the "unspeakable profound."
Moreover, there are many examples that yesterday’s repugnance often becomes today’s
normal. For example, in 1890, the conspicuous psychologist, William James, declared
homosexual activities as “an instinctively repulsive sexual act” in the monumental psychology
textbook of that era, The Principle of Psychology (James, 1890). This “instinct” that
stigmatizes homosexual activities as visceral and nauseating incites prevalent violent hate
crimes against gay people and notably led to the prosecution of Alan Turing under the crime
of “gross indecency” (Doan, 2017). However, as scientific research and the humanist
movement slowly pushed the society towards understanding and inclusivity, the public
gradually opened its arms to the LGBTQ+ community and began to question the validity of
instinct that first repelled homosexuality. Eventually, the LGBTQ+ population became
accepted as a normal and regular part of many communities in the U.S.
Besides, during this year of “new normal,” the entire human society adopted a series of
updated intuitions. We now find it normal to see the street full of people wearing masks, queue
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with 6 feet between each person, or refrain from personal interactions. After all, with society
constantly developing, human intuitions are constantly changing and adapting to the
environment. As a result, it would be unfair to impose our current intuitions of normality onto
the future, where the intuitions could be drastically different.
In all, intuitional normal is overrated: this normal is manipulatable under even slight
conditioning and limited to the current circumstances. Thus, it would be an unsuccessful
strategy to adopt the intuitional norm as a standard to judge what is normal.

In conclusion of 2.2, after close investigation, neither statistical norm nor intuitional norm
could constitute a reliable standard of normality. Given the difficulty of identifying normality,
it does not seem that one can demarcate negative enhancement and positive enhancement.
Therefore, the ethical difference that permits negative enhancement yet forbids positive
enhancement boils down to arbitrary decisions based on inconsistent, unreliable standards of
normality. Ultimately, it is not ethically meaningful to categorize human genetic engineering
into positive or negative enhancements.

2.3.

RADICAL VERSUS REGULAR ENHANCEMENT

2.3.1. Introduction to Radical and Regular Enhancement
The other types of genetic enhancement that bioethicists usually distinguish between are
radical and regular enhancements. There are many definitions of radical enhancement in
different pieces of literature. This thesis adopts Nicholas Agar’s definition of radical
enhancement, that is, enhancement techniques that turn individuals into fundamentally
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different kinds of beings that “no longer deserve to be called human” (Agar, 2008). The most
central idea in this distinction is human nature. If the enhancement transgresses human nature,
it is radical; otherwise, it is regular. Examples of radical enhancement include immortality,
ever-happiness, and dramatic extension of human features (such as intelligence, heights, or
vision).
Philosophers argue that since radical enhancement pushes individuals too far away from
human nature, it will degrade humanity and bring dire consequences to society. Take
immortality as an example. Philosophers across eras, such as Bernard Williams and Martin
Heidegger, advocate that death is an essential and necessary part of a human being. In other
words, an individual deprived of death does not constitute a human life (Williams, 1973;
Heidegger, 1927). Agar endorses the statements from earlier philosophers and adds that human
without death will live in infinite boredom, involve in risky behaviors, and rarely give
appreciations to things that current human do (Agar, 2008). Fukuyama also imagines an
ominous future where an infinite life expectancy leads to a meager fertility rate, unproductive
workforce, and moral chaos (Fukuyama, 2002). George Annas further exacerbates this fear
that since genetically engineered human possess power and ability way superior to the current
human, they are very unlikely to treat the current humans equal and will see the current human
as an inferior species and target of slavery and slaughter (Annas, 2002). Indeed, an element of
immortality or the like seems to be an unbearable load that humanity and human society cannot
possibly undertake. Therefore, these bioethicists suggest that human society should always
avoid the development of radical enhancement to maintain the integrity of human nature and
avert devastating consequences.
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2.3.2. Response to Radical and Regular Enhancement Distinction and Consequences:
Into the Unknown
In response to the radical and regular enhancement distinction and consequences that
radical enhancement might bring, this thesis will discuss the flexibility of human nature and
promote an attitude of acceptance towards a new future that the radical enhancement might
bring. After all, because no enhancement could infringe human nature and is destined to incur
disastrous consequences, radical enhancement is nothing more than regular enhancement
subjectively aggravated by irrational fears.

2.3.2.1.

What Is Human Nature and How Much Can We Change It?

Among bioethicists, there are two contradicting attitudes towards human nature:
bioconservatists and transhumanists. Bioconservatists argue that human nature is not infinitely
plastic and hence cautions towards radical enhancement. It is worth noting that bioconservatists
do not argue that human nature is perfectly static; instead, they admit that human nature attains
a certain degree of flexibility. Kass describes his accepted range of enhancement in an analogy
that one can teach young birds to fly but not teach an elephant to tap dance (Kass, 2003).
Fukuyama puts the limits of human nature into the term of species variance, where every
species has its specific maximum and minimum. For instance, a chihuahua cannot grow as big
as a polar bear because its being the species of chihuahua gives a limit of how much it can
grow. Similarly, individuals' being the species homo sapiens gives them certain limits to their
constitutions fundamental to their species identity (Fukuyama, 2002). Following their ideas of
human nature, bioconservatists contend that the radical enhancement that overly stretches
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human nature is disrespectful towards human dignity and would eventually turn future humans
into a different species.
On the other hand, transhumanists deny the existence of a limit to human capabilities or
any confinement to the definition of human nature. They argue that if there is anything essential
to human nature, it will be the tireless striving to improve humans themselves (Bostrom, 2005).
This view echoes in the philosophy of Aristotle that advocates indefinable potentiality, that of
Fredrich Nietzsche that promotes creativity as an authentic way of living, or that of Jean-Paul
Sartre that encourages liberation from our facticity (Stanford Encyclopedia, 2020; Nietzsche,
1882; Sartre, 1943). These philosophers would hesitate to set a restricted essence to human
beings because they observe that existence always precedes the essence. In Sartre’s words,
“man exists, turns up, appears on the scene, and only afterwards, defines himself” (Sartre,
1957). In other words, the process to define human nature is retrospective, where we make and
remake the definition of human nature only after our constant explorations into and novel
realizations of our new potentials. If they were to put their ideas into Kass’s analogy, they
would contend the following: nothing is denigrating about teaching tap dance to elephant’s
nature since the fact that the elephant can do the tap dance shows that tap dance is merely a
formerly unrevealed part of the elephant’s nature. Therefore, transhumanists believe that the
radical enhancement that the bioconservatists dread is ultimately a part of our nature previously
undiscovered (or yet to become), and that we should never wince in front of a self-discovering
journey, no matter how crazy that might be.
The comparison between the views of bioconservatists and transhumanists reveals the
limitedness and exclusivity of bioconservatists’ perspectives on human nature. Nevertheless,
bioconservatists could hardly rationalize these constraints except through faulty strategies
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mentioned in 2.2.2., such as statistical studies that show the range of human abilities or
intuitional disgust towards things out of their natures. Therefore, instead of sweating like a
bioconservatist to define human nature and ending up with numerous failures, why don’t we
accept the all-is-welcomed transhumanist idea and embrace our infinite possibilities as part of
who we are. There is no limit to human nature, not even the sky.

2.3.2.2.

How Should We Face the Consequences of Enhancements?

Even though some bioconservatists accept that human nature can be infinitely extended,
they still defend that some enhancements would still bring more severe consequences than
others. These changes include fundamental shifts in individuals’ perception and ideology and
substantial upheavals in social structures. In addition to immortality, another example would
be strengthening an individual’s strength by 10% versus strengthening by 100,000 times. An
individual with a ten percent increase of strength would certainly have some benefits in his or
her life, such as the ease to open a stubborn jar, but this change could bring nothing significant.
By contrast, if an individual strengthens his or her strength by 100,000 times, this Herculean
gift would significantly alter his or her way of living—he or she could crack steel in a light
touch, lift mountains, and become a demolition to any enemy. It is unimaginable how this
individual could ever lead the same life as he or she used to have. It would be even more
challenging for him or her to transition into this life of incredible strength. His or her strength
will likely turn into the Midas touch that brings ultimate misfortunes. Consequently,
bioconservatists identify radical enhancement as one that brings fundamental changes and
suggest against it because most changes it provokes are catastrophic to both individuals and
society.
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However, there are two problems with this consequentialist distinction. Firstly, the
magnitude of enhancement does not necessarily correspond to the significance of its
consequence; therefore, the consequences of an enhancement are not always predictable. For
instance, Connie increased her intelligence by 20% while Simon increased his intelligence by
400,000 times. Simon with his unfathomable intelligence transcended worldly values and
decided to sit in his armchair to think about philosophy for the rest of his life. Yet, surprisingly,
Connie utilized her enhanced intelligence and schemed a worldwide disaster. In this case, even
though Connie had a much slighter enhancement than Simon, she left an enormous scar on the
world while Simon did almost nothing. Therefore, given its unpredictability, the consequences
of a certain enhancement are not always apparent in foresight.
One response to the unpredictability is that instead of assessing the consequences of enhancement prospectively, we could evaluate the consequences empirically to judge whether
the enhancement is radical and catastrophic. For example, if 90% of individuals with the
100,000-time enhanced strength became a major threat to society, this enhancement is
empirically proven to be radical and dangerous. Therefore, through empirical evidence, one
can decide whether an enhancement is radical by the evaluating the consequences of what has
happened.
However, this response has a prominent weakness, that is, blending the principle with
practical factors. In other words, the enhancement itself could be harmless, but the practical
way that the enhancement is performed along with other external factors precipitates the
horrendous results. Consider the following analogy: Vivian keeps getting sick from eating
vegetables on an industrially polluted farm. Indeed, the result is that Vivian keeps getting sick.
Yet, it does not mean the act of eating vegetables is sickening; instead, the culprit is the external
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circumstance that the vegetable that she eats grows out of an industrially polluted land.
Similarly, if we see the results that individuals with colossal strength often become a threat to
society, it does not necessarily mean the enhancement itself is culpable for the results, as the
fault could lie in the practice or external factors. Hence, it would be even more complex to use
empirical results to decide whether an enhancement is radical due to the entanglement of
practical and external elements.
Furthermore, a subversive consequence that an enhancement could bring is not always
catastrophic. Throughout human history, the fear towards unknown reveals itself most
prominently during the revolutionary movement. Industrialization in the 19th century has
substantially restructured human society. Aside from material improvements, such as railroads,
electricity, and machinery, industrialization significantly changed the population structure and
even incited multiple worldwide revolutions. In the eyes of preindustrial society,
industrialization is undoubtedly a threatening upheaval that roots up their concepts of human
society and produces terrifyingly overpowered posthumans who transport themselves in cars,
use machines to perform tasks and communicate remotely. Nevertheless, when we look at life
today with fruits accumulated from generations of technology development, we would be
stunned by how irrational these fears are. Similarly, why should we believe bioconservatists’
overblown fantasies and let our ignorance hijack our progress towards HGE and a better life
for the next generation?
In sum, bioconservatists fail to establish the definition of radical enhancement through its
consequences due to its unpredictability and demonstrate unreasonable fear and reservation
towards changes that could dramatically improve human society.
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2.4.

CONCLUISON
In the closing of section 2, this section has established that it is irrational and meaningless

to establish distinctions of negative versus positive or of radical versus regular in the practice
of HGE. Some arguments in this section will be referred to in later sections, given their
undeniable similarity. In the following discussion, HGE will be discussed as a general whole
that carries consistent moral weight.
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3. MORAL PERMISSIBILITY OF HUMAN GENETIC

ENGINEERING

3.1.

INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PERMISSIBILITY OF HUMAN GENETIC
ENGINEERING
Moral permissibility indicates a moral status of mere allowance. In other words, one can

perform a morally permissible practice without inciting any criticism towards one’s ethical
integrity. However, if the action is merely morally permissible, it is in no way morally
encouraged. That is to say, one who performs a merely morally permissible action also
deserves no praise. An example of a merely morally permissible act would be sleeping, which
brings neither moral blame nor acclaim to the action-performing subject. This section intends
to establish that HGE is at least a merely morally permissible practice by responding to various
objections and pointing out their futility in attacking HGE.
For clarity, this thesis roughly divides these objections into three categories: deontic
objections, consequentialist objections, and miscellaneous objections. Deontic objections
focus on HGE’s inherent moral value regardless of the results that HGE creates.
Consequentialist objections emphasize the evaluations of HGE’s consequences and possible
solutions to potential problems. Miscellaneous objections are the ones that discuss relevant
problems of HGE that do not necessarily belong to the first two categories. The groupings of
these objections only serve to deliver a more transparent structure to the overall argument and
should contain no indication of different ethical treatment.
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3.2.

DEONTIC OBJECTIONS
This section of deontic objections to HGE consists of investigations towards the legitimacy

for two objections that attack HGE as an inherently faulty practice regardless of its
consequences. The thesis will discredit both of these objections and establish the deontological
moral permissibility of HGE.

3.2.1. Defying the Divinity of God
This objection appeals to the authority of God and claims that HGE demonstrates a
Promethean arrogance, that is, a prideful presumption of intervening in the natural order and
violating the wills of God. Outside the realm of bioethics, it is not surprising that this objection
is overwhelmingly supported by religious population. Catholic Churches and some
conservative Protestant groups have taken an especially strong stance to guard the natural
integrity of human being as a respect to God’s plan. They argue that since human genomes, as
a natural part of God’s image, are divinely designed by God, artificial alteration of human
genomes is a blasphemous practice that violates God’s divine plan (Glover, 1984; Kass, 2003).
To tackle this objection convincingly, this thesis proceeds with recognition of the validity
of these religious beliefs, even though many beliefs, including the divine existence, are still
under philosophical debates. In other words, this thesis will produce a response that is
respectful of opponents’ religious belief. However, this acceptance of religious belief also
brings a challenge: how to deal with religious groups that oppose all kinds of biomedical
interventions, including medicines and reproductive technologies (Evans, 2002). In that case,
this response to establish the moral permissibility of HGE would fundamentally infringe their
religious beliefs and would not be at all successful in any sense. Therefore, the thesis concedes
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its position in front of these particular beliefs and will only target religious resistance that has
fully or partially accepted modern biomedical technologies.
To begin with, the main problem of this type of objection is that it encourages a subservient
attitude towards natural phenomena or processes under the belief that their integrity should be
protected as part of God’s design. This equation between natural phenomena and God’s divine
plan would require humans to adopt unreasonable conditions for living. For example, since it
is humans’ natural inclination to fall ill because of bacterial or viral infection, medicines would
be an artificial alteration of nature and consequently a violation of God’s plan. Aside from how
ridiculous this might sound to secular ears, most religious texts themselves do not preclude the
use of medicines. In Isaiah 38:21, Isaiah gives specific directions on how to cook a medicine
to cure illness; alternatively, Luke 10:34 describes how to deal with infected wounds.
Therefore, the absurdity of this objection not only comes from its potential anti-medicine
attitude but also its contradiction with religious texts. Ultimately, there is no secular nor
religious support that individuals should adopt absolute servitude towards natural processes
and evade artificial interventions, such as medicines and HGE.
Moreover, this objection sometimes falsely overemphasizes the integrity of human
genomes and considers human genes to be a static concept that does not change at all. However,
a closer look at the study of human genetics will show us that human genomes are constantly
varying. One major source of genetic variations happens through the human reproduction
where each biological parent gives the offspring a random half of his or her genetic materials.
This mixing of these genetic materials introduces plasticity into human genomes to resist
environmental changes. This genetic variation also explains why a child will inherit traits from
both of his or her parents instead of being identical to one of his or her biological parents.
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Besides reproduction, cellular genetic replication never conforms to perfect fidelity, because
benign mutations would propel the species’ natural evolution. Some other genetic changes may
involve an invasion of virus that inserts its genetic material into the human DNA or an exposure
to Ultraviolet (UV) radiation that damages the DNA. Overall, human genetic information has
been constantly changing without apparent harm to God’s divinity. Therefore, the idea that
God’s divine plan necessarily relies on the perfect integrity of the human genome is obviously
misguided.
Therefore, the objection that HGE would defy God’s divine plan does not stand due to its
irrational servitude towards natural processes and its misunderstanding of genetic mechanisms.

3.2.2. Degrading Children as Products and Conditional Parental Love
This objection is a derivational argument of Elizabeth Anderson’s objection towards
commercial surrogacy. Anderson points out that as commercial surrogacy would
inappropriately treat children with lower modes of valuations than they deserve, children
would ultimately become mere commodities in the scheme of commercial surrogacy and
receive only conditional parental love based on their traits (Anderson, 1990). Burley and Harris
apply Anderson’s argument onto HGE and argue in similar lines that children would become
mere products under the practice of HGE and only receive parental love contingent on their
desirable traits (Burley & Harris, 1999). As (potential) persons, children have their inalienable
interests and deserve to be respected. However, in the practice of HGE, children seem to
become the mere products of HGE and are alienated from their deserved interests and respect.
Besides, since parents could handpick the traits of their children through HGE, their love
becomes contingent on the traits their children have instead of on the children themselves.
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However, this objection has a couple of weaknesses. First, the process of HGE does not
necessarily denigrate children into mere products. Analogously, surgery (or most medical
interventions) will produce children with improved health status, but no one would claim that
surgery lowers the status of children from people to products of the surgery. Ultimately, the
purpose of HGE is to give children a better life with enhanced capabilities instead of
downgrading children into objects. Therefore, it is mistaken to assume that the process of HGE
would undermine the modes of valuations towards children, given its benign intentions and
similarity to medical interventions.
Additionally, this objection exaggerates the necessity of unconditional love for children.
Indeed, we often hear parents say that they love their children unconditionally, but that speech
can hardly establish sufficient proof that parental love is always unconditional. There are many
cases to support that parental love is often conditional even without HGE. For example, many
parents love their children only because of their biological connections. There are numerous
cases that once a parent finds out a child is not his or her biological offspring, their parental
love significantly diminishes. In addition to biological connections, parental love could be
contingent upon children’s appearance, achievements, social status, choice of spouse, sexual
orientations, and many other factors. Therefore, it is questionable to object to HGE by stating
that children necessarily deserve unconditional parental love when it is often not the case even
in a world without HGE.
Moreover, even if some parental loves are unconditional, it is unlikely that the trait-picking
process in HGE would taint this love. Trait-picking is not a process exclusive to HGE and has
empirically proven to be compatible with unconditional parental love. In Darwinian theory,
sexual selection is an already process that includes picking the trait for one’s children. When
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one selects a spouse for procreational purposes, he or she also unconsciously (or sometimes
consciously) selects traits for his or her children whose half of the gene will come from one’s
spouse. In some matchmaking clubs, this consideration even becomes the primary concern for
the participants. Not to mention in sperm or egg banks, handpicking donor is an unavoidable
step. Nevertheless, among these conscious or unconscious handpicking processes, some
parental loves remain unconditional. Hence, it is unfair to judge the handpicking process in
HGE differently when handpicking children’s traits can be perfectly compatible with
unconditional parental love in other scenarios.
In sum, the objections that contend HGE would degrade children as mere products or
deprive children of unconditional parental love cannot overthrow the moral legitimacy of HGE,
because these objections misunderstand the intention of HGE, exaggerate the necessity of
unconditional parental love, and overlook the compatibility of handpicking with unconditional
parental love.

3.3.

CONSEQUENTIALIST OBJECTIONS
This section of consequentialist objections comprises of three objections that concern about

the consequences of HGE development. This section intends to dismiss fears of these
consequences and provide possible solutions to potential problems that HGE might lead.

3.3.1. Widening Social Gap between Rich and Poor
Philosophers like Sandel and Fukuyama concern that even if HGE can bring conducive
effects to individuals, it may aggravate existing disparities in society (Sandel, 2003; Fukuyama,
2002). They argue that if HGE cannot be available to all people, it will incur an unfair
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advantage to individuals who possess this technology (likely among the wealthy population).
Children with engineered genes are more intelligent, athletic, creative, musical. They will
likely have a competitive advantage in school, career, or just any aspect of life choices.
Therefore, wealthy people become wealthier because of their genetic advantages, while poor
people become only more impoverished. Eventually, the rich and the poor will be not only
different in social status but also different in genetic makeups. Therefore, because the HGE is
likely to exacerbate the social division between the rich and poor, the development of HGE
should be put on hold.
There are a couple of vulnerabilities of this objection. Firstly, one thing can be good in two
different ways: positional good and absolute good. Positional good indicates an advantage over
others, while absolute good means to give oneself "the best chance for a long and healthy life"
(Harris, 2003). This objection only considers HGE as a positional good to compete with others
but neglects its potential to be an absolute good to improve oneself. For example, if Larry uses
HGE to lengthen his life expectancy for ten years, he obtains some positional good compared
to others who live a shorter life. However, the primary purpose of his life extension is never
the positional good—he hopes to have more time with his grandchildren, visit more places,
and witness how the world will change in the next ten years. This extension of life would allow
Larry much more joyful moments and valuable experiences. If we postpone the research on
HGE merely because its positional good to the rich will likely induce inequality, we sacrifice
all the absolute good for people to have a better life. Thus, this objection ignores the benefits
from the absolute good, which is usually the primary concern in HGE practice.
Admittedly, sometimes the positional good will be the dominant consideration when
people use HGE. However, a focus on positional good alone cannot undermine the moral
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integrity of HGE. Consider the following analogy: parents may give their children a healthy
diet to win them some advantages in the swimming team tryouts. But the act of giving children
a healthy diet is not morally corrupt merely because of its competitive purpose. Then what
about students who use Adderall in SATs or athletes who use steroids in competitions? Aren’t
those practices to increase one’s positional good considered cheating and immoral? To answer
these questions, we must first understand why organizations like the College Board or the
International Olympic Committee prohibit the use of these substances. The main reason is that
these performance-enhancing medications are addictive and dangerous to use without
prescriptions. Adderall is neurotoxic, while steroid users are exposed to a significantly higher
risk of cardiovascular diseases and hormonal dysfunctions (National Institute on Drug Abuse,
2020; Berman et al., 2009). Suppose the College Board or the International Olympic
Committee had not banned the use of these substances. Using these substances would become
a prerequisite to enter SATs or Olympic games because not using them would leave one in a
disadvantageous position. In that case, any SAT or Olympic game would endanger thousands
of lives, and the College Board or the International Olympic Committee would be liable for
these harms. In brief, the primary reason that College Board and International Olympic
Committee ban performance-enhancing drugs is their harmful effects on individuals instead of
the unfair positional good that these drugs can bring. Suppose Adderall and steroids were to
be harmless in all aspects, long-term or short-term. If that would be the case, Adderall and
steroids would become part of the healthy diet to prepare students or athletes before the test or
the game that the College Board or the International Olympic Committee would likely even
encourage to see better performance. We would see smarter students and stronger athletes
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under safe conditions. Why wouldn’t we like that? Similarly, if HGE can be perfectly safe, its
use on positional good would not sabotage its moral coherence.
After all, this objection recognizes HGE is good but concerns that HGE may not be fairly
distributed. The obvious solution is to open HGE’s access to everybody. However, it may not
be evident to the supporters of this objection that the first step to widespread access is to allow
HGE to develop. The development of technology tends to follow the trend from expensive to
cheap and from exclusive to widely available. Harris nicely describes the journey that
technologies have to follow towards fair access:

No one can be ignorant of the fact that procedures which start expensive, rare (even elitist), and risky often
become widely available, if not universal, cheap, relatively safe (safe enough given the balance of risk and benefit),
and widely accessible. […] There is of course reason to fear the escalating costs of high-tech medicine, but the
point for the present argument is that products and procedures need to start somewhere if they are to get anywhere.
This means that unless we permit and possibly fund the development, we never benefit from the product or
procedure ad wide (if not universal) access could never occur. If we banned innovations unless and until they
could be made available to all, it is probable that they would never be (have been) developed (Harris, 2010).

If we want HGE to distribute its benefits to all, we should allow its very first step and every
step towards final distributional equity. Sometimes the initial inequity will even stimulate
faster progress towards equality, as the rich individuals who first receive the benefits of the
HGE can subsidize further research to make it cheaper in the long term (Freiman, 2018).
Therefore, it would be irrational to forsake the whole progress of HGE merely because, at one
stage of its development, it will incite inequalities.
In conclusion, this objection cannot undermine the moral integrity of HGE practice because
it neglects that the primary focus of HGE is its absolute good on individuals, mistakes

35
intentions for positional good as morally corrupt, and ignores that inequity is an inevitable step
towards technological equality.

3.3.2. Eugenic Consequences
Some philosophers worry that the development of HGE that eliminates undesirable traits
would put people who currently have these traits into a disadvantageous position, as the
population that they identify with becomes increasingly smaller (Kitcher, 1996; Powell, 2012).
They even worry that these HGE attempts may be consciously or unconsciously implemented
to reach a homogenized population and result in possible eugenic consequences (Powell, 2012;
Fukuyama, 2002).
For example, with HGE, parents would likely select against autism. As fewer and fewer
autistic children were born, the community of autism would shrink significantly. In a world
where autism is selected against and where the autistic population dwindles by day, the
remaining population with autism would live on a smaller and smaller margin of the society
until they are entirely wiped out from this planet. Similar situations may happen to people with
disabilities, genetic defects, and even undesirable traits like shortness. How would those people
walk into a new era of HGE where they face public denial of themselves and possible extinction?
The first response to this objection hinges on the scientific evaluations on the physical
harms of these genetic traits. In other words, we need to evaluate whether those undesirable
traits are physically neutral or harmful to the individuals. If those traits are physically harmful,
passing on harmful genes to children for the purpose to enlarge their community is evidently
unethical and should be prohibited. Analogously, HIV/AIDS patients are prohibited to
intentionally spread their diseases because it can severely harm others. Premarital screening is
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another existing mean to defer individuals with serious inheritable genetic defects, such as
sickle cell anemia and Huntington chorea, from reproduction in order to alleviate future
suffering of their children. Therefore, in these cases, HGE would be justified to correct these
physically harmful genes and could potentially give the population with harmful genetic
defects unprecedented hopes to have their own children who would not go through the same
suffering as they do.
This objection becomes more challenging to resolve if parents use HGE to select against
physically neutral yet socially unfavored traits, such as shortness. However, techniques that
can correct socially unfavored features are nothing new. Plastic surgery is a similar biomedical
technique that people use to change their physically harmless yet socially unfavored traits. But
even at the age where plastic surgeries have become quite accessible, we do not and will not
likely see a widespread phenomenon of artificial appearances. Why? Because people have a
diverse range of aesthetics and social values. Some groups prefer tall stature while others like
short. Some groups love blonde hair, while others like brunette hair. Among various groups,
people can find their niches where they, as their authentic self, can be accepted and appreciated.
As Fukuyama illustrates, instead of being a necessary outcome of HGE, eugenic policies
and homogenization result from political monopoly and authoritarianism, where one group’s
interests triumph over all others (Fukuyama, 2002). Therefore, the solution is not to stop HGE
but to consider applying HGE in a democratic fashion, such as Nozick’s genetic supermarket
(Nozick, 2013). Overall, even though parents would make the final decision about their
children’s traits based on the social preference of groups they are in, it is unlikely that traits
that some groups do not prefer would be exterminated in a democratic world.
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In all, worries about eugenic consequences and homogenizing society cannot contribute to
a sufficient objection to the practice of HGE because some eugenic processes are necessary to
reduce harm to subsequent generations. Meanwhile, a democratic method of HGE should be
advocated to significantly reduce the likelihood that HGE will be used as a eugenic practice
for monopolistic interests.

3.3.3. Limitations on Next General’s Freedom
James Hughes argues that designer children can hardly be free for all of their traits are
selected by their parents before their birth (Hughes, 2019). As genes act as determining factors
for many human traits, it will be extremely difficult for children to change or deviate from their
genetically chosen path. For example, Fred’s parents decide that they want Fred to be a very
talented pianist, so they alter his genes so that he has better appreciation and mastery of the
piano. Fortunately, Fred turns out to be a great pianist and loves playing the piano. However,
the problem is that it is unlikely for Fred to freely choose not to like piano since his genes are
already altered to be so. In other words, Fred cannot physically or even intentionally opt-out
the path that his parents have set for him and are ultimately unfree. In all, since HGE deprives
children of their entitled freedom, it is unjust for parents to practice HGE (Sandel, 2003).
However, these philosophers ignore that parenting, in general, has a deterministic effect.
In reality, besides HGE, many of our parents' decisions in our childhood have profoundly
influenced us, and all these decisions accumulate and eventually build the individuals whom
we turn out to be. Parents can make lasting decision for us since our childhood: they decide
what food we eat, what books we read, which schools we go to, what language(s) we speak,
what instrument(s) we play. Besides, parents can decide on permanent changes for their
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children just like designing their genes. For example, parents can decide whether their children
receive circumcision, appendectomy, or ligament replacement, which are all permanent
changes yet less questionable. After all, even if Fred's parents do not choose HGE, they can
still create various conditions (such as giving Fred a very musical environment) to make Fred
love the piano and an excellent pianist in numerous ways.
However, one can still object that HGE is more deterministic than parenting because one
still can change his or her inclinations through rebelling at later stages of one’s life but is much
less likely to change with genetic dispositions. Nevertheless, this objection would still
inculpate parents even without HGE since their genes are the only genetic materials that their
children will receive. In simpler words, children will have deterministic genes with or without
HGE. It is the fate of children to have genes and traits decided by their parents. Even without
HGE, children are still destined to look like their biological parents. Even without HGE,
children born of athletes are likely to be athletic and love sports. Children are bound to be
restricted by their parents. Then why do we frown upon HGE when it brings no different
consequences than regular parenting?
They may reply again, indicating an element of random chance in natural reproduction that
HGE lacks. Because parents would not know exactly how their children would look like, how
exactly they would behave, or what exactly their personalities are, this seemingly blissful
ignorance gives room for surprises and free development. Nevertheless, this reply is absurd as
it supports that leaving children’s dispositions to random chances is better than to a careful
control with good intentions. Analogously, if one’s child tears his ligament, there is a non-zero
but slight chance that his ligament will heal by itself. In this case, should this person leave his
child out of surgery just because he hopes for surprises and free development? As absurd as
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this case sounds, so are parents who leave their children out of HGE just because they want to
see how random chances play out in their children’s genes.
Some philosophers still worry that parents would use HGE to micromanage their children
through fine-tuning their children’s genetic make-ups. For example, Phoebe may use HGE to
set her daughter’s hair color to be blonde at the age of ten and brunette at the age of twenty.
Freiman cites the case of Todd Marinovich to illustrate the harm of parental micromanagement:

He has never eaten a Big Mac or an Oreo or a Ding Dong. When he went to birthday parties as a kid, he
would take his own cake and ice cream to avoid sugar and refined white flour. He would eat homemade catsup,
prepared with honey. He did consume beef but not the kind injected with hormones. He ate only unprocessed
dairy products. He teethed on frozen kidney. When Todd was one month old, Marv was already working on his
son’s physical conditioning. He stretched his hamstrings. Pushups were next. Marv invented a game in which
Todd would try to lift a medicine ball onto a kitchen counter. Marv also put him on a balance beam. Both activities
grew easier when Todd learned to walk. There was a football in Todd’s crib from day one. “Not a real NFL ball,”
says Marv. “That would be sick; it was a stuffed ball.” (Freiman, 2018; Looney, 1988)

Todd subsequently led a tragic adult life, struggling with drug addictions. Given Todd’s
case, Freiman argues that micromanaging one’s children through HGE is unhealthy and
exemplifies bad parenting. Therefore, parents should only use HGE to “wisely manage” their
children instead of micromanaging them (Freiman, 2018).
In response, it is first worth noting that every parent has distinct method of parenting and
their own prospect for the children. Besides, parents generally are the ones who have the best
knowledge for their children; therefore, some seemingly unreasonable parenting could actually
be beneficial for their children. Then who is it to decide whether parents are harming their
children because of their distinct parenting style that they consider to be the best for the
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children? Who is it to tell that micromanaging children does not exemplify wise parenting
when some parents can use micromanagement so skillfully to benefit their children the most?
Consider the controversial “Tiger Mom” parenting style demonstrated in Amy Chua’s book,
Battle Hymn of the Tiger Mother:

I hauled Lulu's dollhouse to the car and told her I'd donate it to the Salvation Army piece by piece if she
didn't have 'The Little White Donkey' [a piano piece] perfect by the next day. When Lulu said, 'I thought you
were going to the Salvation Army, why are you still here?' I threatened her with no lunch, no dinner, no Christmas
or Hanukkah presents, no birthday parties for two, three, four years. When she still kept playing it wrong, I told
her she was purposely working herself into a frenzy because she was secretly afraid she couldn't do it. I told her
to stop being lazy, cowardly, self-indulgent and pathetic (Chua, 2012).

Critics consider that Chua’s parenting method is unduly ruthless and insensitive, and some
even accuse Chua’s parenting as borderline child abuse. Nevertheless, in 2011, an open letter
from Chua’s daughter, Sophia, was published in New York Post. Sophia defended her mother’s
parenting strategy and ended her letter saying that “If I died tomorrow, I would die feeling I’ve
lived my whole life at 110 percent. And for that, Tiger Mom, thank you” (Chua-Rubenfeld,
2011). In this case, it would be presumptuous to declare that Chua had an awful parenting
method just because of how it looks to strangers. After all, the parent-child relationship is one
of the most intimate relationships in the world, and, generally, we should leave the parents to
decide what is best for their children. If micromanaging children’s DNA is a necessary step in
their parenting style, so be it. (Nevertheless, this is not to say there is no bad parenting, whose
prominent features and solutions will be illustrated in section 4.3.2.)
Therefore, the objections and worries mentioned in this section is largely unfounded, as
parenting has profound, permanent effects on children with or without HGE, and the exact way
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how parents hope to use HGE for their kids’ benefits should be a decision within their own
discretion.

3.4.

MISCELLANEOUS OBJECTIONS
This section will briefly discuss the objections about unearned achievements and

complexity in HGE and will ultimately defend HGE and question the legitimacy of these two
objections

3.4.1. Unearned Achievements
Leon Kass raises another objection that the enhancements brought by HGE is unqualified
good and diminishes human efforts. Consider the following example. Cathy and Diane both
participate in a marathon race and cross the finish line at the same time. However, the only
difference between Cathy and Diane is that Cathy is genetically engineered to run long distance
while Diane is not. All things being equal, it seems that Diane’s effort in this race is more
praiseworthy than Cathy’s since she is unassisted by external factors and achieves her success
through struggles and difficulties. Indeed, if one attains achievements through HGE, it looks
to be “cheating” or “cheap” as one’s efforts are detached from the achievements (Kass, 2003).
In other words, in order to ensure one’s achievement to be acknowledged appropriately, one
needs to manifest the "alert, self-experiencing agent" who does voluntary deeds (Kass, 2003).
Overall, Kass contends that HGE creates a lack of authenticity in achievements and disrespects
genuine human efforts.
Nonetheless, Kass’s objection is insufficient to deny the moral legitimacy of HGE because
his objection ignores the existing genetic disparities between abilities and the fact that HGE
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will become an integral part of human nature and identity. To illustrate the first idea, consider
the following example. Usain Bolt has a genetic disposition that equips him with long
ligaments and strong muscles to run incredibly fast. This genetic disposition is unique to Bolt
and not available to anyone else in the world. However, it does not seem that Bolt’s outstanding
genetic disposition renders his achievements less valuable. Then why would we object to the
achievements of people with artificially enhanced genes but not to those of people with
naturally enhanced genes. Therefore, the existing genetic disparities has proven the unnecessity
of Kass’s objections as genetic advantages do not necessarily diminish our achievements.
Additionally, as discussed in 2.3.2.1, human nature should be treated as all-encompassing
and ever-evolving. As human society gradually adapts to the technology of HGE, we would
eventually see HGE as an inalienable part of ourselves. Even today, people have embraced
some biomedical enhancements, such as ACL reconstructions, as an integral part of human
beings and have no problem recognizing the achievements of athletes with these enhancements.
Therefore, HGE would not separate our achievements from ourselves as it would eventually
become part of who we are.
Therefore, since existing genetic disparities and enhancement procedures have not
dampened our achievements in the way that Kass describes, we should instead hold an open
attitude towards HGE and accept it as part of who we are.

3.4.2. Devil’s Bargain
Some philosophers express their anxiety towards HGE, worrying that changing human
genes will ultimately be a devil’s bargain, where one benefits will be traded for equivalent
curses. Fukuyama presents that the relationship between genes and traits, or phenotypes, is
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complicated as in some cases, one gene can control multiple traits, while in others, multiple
genes control only one trait. Besides, genes’ advantages are relative. For example, the sickle
cell anemia gene can protect people from malaria in Africa but presents themselves as genetic
defects in Western societies where malaria is never a threat. Therefore, he argues that
manipulating genes to yield desirable outcomes will be extremely difficult given these
complexities (Fukuyama, 2002).
Nevertheless, Fukuyama’s pessimism is more of a concern about our scientific knowledge
rather than a principal objection to HGE. Indeed, it would be reckless and irresponsible to
practice HGE before we fully understand the functions of specific genes. However, it does not
mean HGE is a practice that would inevitably bring side effects because of the complexity of
genes. As our scientific knowledge progresses, there is no reason to believe that scientists will
never approach a clear understanding of genetic mechanisms and improve the safety of HGE.
After all, we should always have hope that scientific progress would eventually bring safe,
widely accessible HGE to reality.

3.5.

CONCLUSION
In this section, we have explored seven objections to HGE in the category of deontic,

consequentialist, and miscellaneous. After close investigation, it is evident that none of these
objections can refute HGE's moral legitimacy. Therefore, HGE should be established at least
as a morally permissible practice where parents who use its service would not be morally
blameworthy in any respect.
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4. MORAL OBLIGATIONS TO HUMAN GENETIC ENGINEERING

4.1.

INTRODUCTION TO MORAL OBLIGATIONS TO HUMAN GENETIC
ENGINEERING
After establishing the moral permissibility of HGE, this thesis intends to take a step further

and endorse the moral obligations of HGE. Moral obligations describe actions that would not
necessarily receive moral praise, but the failure to perform these actions would incite moral
blame. For example, once we made a promise, it would be morally obligated to keep the
promise without extenuating circumstances. If one keeps the promise, one will not necessarily
receive any praise as the action is what he or she supposed to do. However, if one breaks the
promise, one will be morally blameworthy.
This section intends to establish that HGE aligns with parental obligations to give their
children a better life. Therefore, if beneficial HGE becomes easily accessible to family and the
society in general, failure to use HGE would incur moral blames to the parents because they
fail to fulfill their duties.

4.2.

PARENTAL OBLIGATION TO BETTERMENT OF CHILDREN

4.2.1. Introduction to Parental Obligation to Betterment of Children
Parental obligation has always been a relatively incontrovertible subject in moral
philosophy, as even philosophers who take children as mere properties of parents endorse
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parental ob-ligation (Naverson, 1988). Parental obligations could find their theoretical support
in many forms, such as genetic and gestational connections to children, the social agreement
between prospective parents and the moral community, and the causation of new existence
(Austin, 2020). Although it could be discussed extensively which model best describes the
parental obligation to the children, that would be unnecessary for the purpose of this thesis.
But to avoid controversy, this thesis takes parental obligations in the most basic sense: parents
have the prima facie obligation to provide resources that support the children's potential
betterment, ceteris paribus (Freiman, 2018).
The parental obligation is prima facie because in no way should parents take their
obligations as an absolute, unquestionable duty before everything else. It certainly is
reasonable for parents to spend some time with their friends at a marginal cost to their
children’s happiness. Parents should also exercise their obligations with respect to others’
deontic rights. For instance, a mother cannot attack another skater to improve her daughter’s
chance in the Olympics. Besides, the obligation is placed in conditionals (i.e., ceteris paribus)
because practical concerns are not primary considerations here. Although there are a million
ways that an HGE practice could be misused (will be discussed in 4.3.2.) or go wrong in
practical scenarios (discussed in section 2.3.2.2.), these empirical consequences are not
inherent defects of HGE and are thus not included in this section’s discussion (Freiman, 2018)
To illustrate the parental obligations to children’s betterment, consider the following
examples. George’s family moves to a neighborhood with two schools. School A provides
low-quality education with unqualified teachers and poorly furnished facilities, while School
B offers excellent education with well-educated teachers and newly refurbished infrastructures.
Children would generally learn more, make more valuable friendships, and have a better
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experience at School B than School A. School B can also better prepare children for college
and future job market than School A. Given these conditions, which school should George’s
parents choose? All else being equal, it is only reasonable and morally required for George’s
parents to send George to School B. Similarly, George’s parents were to choose between two
diet plans that they would offer George. Diet A consists of exclusively junk food that offers
minimal health benefits to George. Meanwhile, Diet B comprises healthy food whose nutrition
will substantially support George’s growth and health. All else being equal, which diet plan
should George’s parents choose? There is no doubt that the right diet that George’s parents
should choose is Diet B. In sum, parents have a defeasible obligation to improve their
children’s welfare, all else being equal.

4.3.

PARENTAL OBLIGATIONS TO HUMAN GENETIC ENGINEERING

4.3.1. Introduction to Parental Obligations to Human Genetic Engineering
So far it has been established that parents have a defeasible obligation to allow a better life
to their children, all things being equal. Therefore, if HGE ever becomes safe and accessible
with proper restrictions mentioned in section 3 (such that excludes physically harmful genes),
there is no reason to stop parents to make their children better and give them a better life.
Let’s take George’s family as an example again. Suppose George’s parents are presented
with the HGE option to increase their child’s intelligence by 40%. The technology is proven
safe with approvals from the entire scientific community and guarantees to leave no harm to
George. Additionally, in many previous cases of this HGE practice, this increase of intelligence
by 40% not only gives the enhanced children a leg up in educational opportunities and job
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placement but also allows them an overall better life experience, given a clearer comprehension
of everything presented to them. In this case, if everything else is equal, it would be morally
required for George’s parents to use the HGE as the failure to do so would violate their parental
obligations to the betterment of their child.

4.3.2. Concerns of Parental Obligations to Human Genetic Engineering and Responses
Nevertheless, there are some concerns about this parental obligation to HGE. To begin with,
some people would likely worry that since parents have different standards of what is better
for their children (as discussed in 3.3.3.), it might lead to potential harm to the children because
of parents’ poor decision or bad values. For example, since Daisy believes that depression is a
necessary part of life experience and would help her child to appreciate happiness more, she
engineers her child’s genes and makes depression a frequent part of his childhood.
There are three scenarios to demonstrate Daisy’s possible intentions.
(1) She intentionally hopes to improve her child through HGE, but she is misinformed.
(2) She intentionally wants to harm her child and disguises her true intentions.
(3) She knows clearly what is best for her child and uses HGE to do so.
The purpose of laying out three scenarios is to distinguish between righteous use, misuse,
and malicious use of HGE. Correspondingly, (1) is an example of misuse; (2) is an example of
malicious use; (3) is an example of justified use, despite that her action seems unreasonable.
The misuse and malicious use of HGE do not undermine HGE’s claim on moral obligation. As
an analogy, one can huff the glue (i.e., misuse) or use the glue to poison someone (i.e.,
malicious use), but these inappropriate uses of glue will not constitute an indictment of glue
(Freiman, 2018). To guard against these misuses and malicious uses, the distributors of HGE
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should therefore ascertain the intentions and knowledge of parents about a specific type of
HGE before granting them permission. Prevention measures may include a HGE licensing test
for prospective parents or the requirement for a formal application and careful review if
irregular enhancements would be needed. Yet ultimately, these practical concerns should not
obstruct parents’ moral obligation to use HGE.
What about the scenario (3)? Is Daisy justified to engineer her children to be depressed if
she has good knowledge and a benign intention? As mentioned in 3.3.3., we should recognize
that every parent has his or her distinct method of parenting and the best knowledge for their
children; therefore, some seemingly unreasonable parental styles could be ultimately beneficial
for their children. Therefore, if Daisy’s parenting method will yield what is the best for her
child after balancing its harm and benefits, her use of HGE should be permitted and obligatory
no matter how crazy that might look to others.
Another worry that people usually have is that when genetic enhancement becomes a
parental obligation, there would be an “arms race” between parents as no one wants their
children to lose at the starting line (Harris, 2003). Eventually, despite enormous resources
devoted into HGE, the positional good will be canceled out as every child has gone through
similar HGE and obtained similar enhancements.
In 3.3.1., the thesis has established that positional intentions are not morally corrupt, and
that we should solve the inequality by opening up the access. Moreover, if done right, the “arms
race” will be beneficial to all children as it would raise their absolute good. As the entire
generation becomes smarter, stronger, more creative, and more musical, the “arms race” will
undoubtedly make our society a better place with better teachers, doctors, athletes, engineers,
and artists. Why wouldn’t we welcome that?
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4.4.

CONCLUSION
In section 4, the parental obligation to human genetic engineering emerges from the prima

facie parental obligation to allow children a better life. We should not confuse the parental
obligation to righteous uses of HGE with misuses and malicious uses, both of which should be
prevented. Finally, we should welcome the “arms race” between parents that would help the
construction of a better society.
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5. CONCLUSION

5.1.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
To sum up, this thesis has introduced the practice of HGE and relevant contemporary

debates in section 1. This thesis then established that categorizing HGE into negative versus
positive enhancements or radical versus regular enhancements is not morally meaningful and
that HGE should be treated as a coherent moral entity in section 2. The thesis then defends
HGE against seven moral objects and establishes HGE’s moral permissibility. Finally, this
thesis elevates HGE to be morally obligatory because of its alignment with parental obligations
to children’s betterment.
As the HGE technique constantly develops, it would be interesting to see how its future
advancement will influence our moral decisions and even our recognitions about normality,
human nature, religious divinity, social justice, and the parent-child relationship. However,
with an inclusive attitude towards changes, this thesis will unlikely shift its position regardless
of HGE’s future development but will strive to defend HGE against more challenges.
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